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American Perceptions of Iran
Avery Bissett
Department of Political Science, Chapman University; Orange, California
Introduction to Research
This study explores how the medium through
which a person consumes their news influences
their perception of Iran’s nuclear program and
American foreign policy toward Iran.
Several factors influence public opinion of
American foreign policy
Media: Coverage and framing of an issue;
agenda setting
Elites/Opinion leaders: According to Edward S.
Herman and Noam Chomsky, elites dominate
the media and marginalize dissidents.
Therefore, the media operates under a
propaganda model to further the agenda and
interests of elites. For example, elites favor a
more active U.S. role in the world than everyday
Americans. However, they date suggests they
are more partisan than general public.
Interest Groups: There are many influential
lobbying groups that influence American foreign
policy and public opinions. For example, public
opinion of Israel is influenced by JewishAmerican lobby and also Israel itself.
Partisanship/Party identification: Up to the end
of the Vietnam War, there was not a strong
correlation between public opinion of foreign
policy and party identification. After that, clearer
partisan cleavages that correlate to opinion o
foreign policy can be observed.
Demographics: Differences such as gender,
socioeconomic status, education or generation
influence foreign policy opinions.
Ultimately, the media is heavily intertwined many
of the factors that influence public opinion of
foreign policy.

American Perceptions of Iran
Because of America’s historical isolationism
and avoidance of wars, Americans have a
tendency to view the world in black and white
terms.
We are the good guys, they are the bad guys,
and there is no middle ground.
Americans have a tendency to view Iran as
driven by religious radicalism and therefore
undeterrable.
Americans have a tendency to view
adversaries and world through historical lenses
Americans automatically assume that a
nuclear armed-Iran would be inherently
destabilizing and threatening to the Middle
East and the U.S.
Limited engagement between the U.S. and
Iran, in addition to its sponsorship of terrorism
have only further hardened American
perceptions of Iran.
Research suggests that there is a American
media bias toward Iran’s nuclear program.

Findings and Conclusions

Hypotheses:
H 1: The medium through which a person gets political information influences whether they think Iran is developing a nukes.
H 2: The more frequently a person consumes media, the more likely they are to think Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
H 3: Some mediums are more influential in shaping perceptions of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran.

Is Iran developing nuclear weapons?

Does the frequency with which a person consumes
media influence their perceptions of Iran?

Is Iran pursuing nuclear weapons?
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Comparison of Different Mediums Influences on Iran
Source of
Political
Information

Correlation

Internet Blogs -.029

Standardized
Coefficient

Significance

-.028

.198

Internet News

.03

.044

.036

Magazines
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-.031

.145
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Newspapers
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.019
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Social Media
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-.071

.001

Television

.139

.117

.000

R-squared: .027
Significance level: .05

Table Interpretation
•The table measures the correlation
and regression between different
news mediums and whether
Americans believe Iran is developing
nuclear weapons.
•Only internet news, print
newspapers, social media and
television had statistically significant
relationships with whether Americans
believe Iran was developing nuclear
weapons.
•The relationships between internet
blogs, magazines and radio with
whether Americans believe Iran is
pursuing nuclear weapons were not
statistically significant.
•Of those, television by far had the
strongest correlation with whether
Americans believe Iran is developing
nuclear weapons. This was followed
by print newspapers, social media
and internet news.

H 1: Medium influences on U.S. opinion of Iran
While the numbers of Americans who believed Iran
was developing nuclear weapons were not
identical across all mediums, the figures were still
very close. Consequently, the percentages were
nearly identical as well. Thus, I conclude that
regardless of the medium, the breakdown of those
who think Iran is developing nuclear weapons and
those who think Iran isn’t was within a percentage
point or two of a 90 percent/10 percent split.
H 2: Frequency of media consumption and Iran
For all mediums, there was a clear relationship
between how often the media was consumed and
opinion of Iran. For political blogs, magazines and
to a lesser extent social media, the more media
was consumed, the less likely the person was to
believe Iran was developing nuclear weapons. For
Internet news, print, radio and TV, it was the
inverse.
H 3: How effectively did different media
influence American opinion of Iran’s nuclear
program?
There was a statistically significant relationship
between media and American influence of Iran
only for internet news, print newspapers, social
media and television. Of those, television by far
was the most influential of American opinion,
followed by print. The influence of social media
and internet news trailed much farther behind. Of
the statistically significant media mediums, only
social media had a negative correlation, which
meant it was the only medium that caused people
to believe Iran was developing nuclear weapons
the less they consumed political information
through social media.
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